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DEBT OF LEGATEE TO THE TESTATOR, BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS, AS DEFENSE IN A SUIT FOR THE LEGACY.
A recent decision of the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of New York' attracts attention because of the inherent
interest of the above subject. The testatrix left $2oooo as a
legacy to her brother. He, with two other makers, was indebted
to her in the sum of $30,ooo upon three promissory notes against
which the statute of limitations had long since run. In an action
by the legatee against the executor for the legacy it was held that
the legatee was entitled to judgment, inasmuch as his was a
distinct independent legal claim and as the statute-barred debt
could no more be recovered by the estate than by any other
creditor.
The court bases its conclusion upon the typical case of Allen
v. Edwards,2 but it is respectfully submitted that the more
I Kimball v. Scribner (ii6) 161 N. Y. Suppl. 511.
2 (1883) 136 Mass. 138; see also Hesley v. Shaw (1905) 120 Ili. App.
92, which is identical in its facts with the principal case. There the court
[236]
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equitable rule is the one prevailing in the English Chancery and,
heretofore, in the New York Surrogate -Courts. The claim of
the estate in the principal case had not in fact been paid, and
no presumption of payment arises from lapse of time. Hence,
these claims should be considered assets in the hands of the
executor for which he should account. The right of the executor
to retain out of the legacy an amount due from the legatee
has been described in a Maine cases as an equitable right of
its own nature different from the technical right of set-off in
common law actions. Now if this be an equitable right of its
own nature, why should not equitable principles apply? It is, of
course, established that equity follows the law to the extent of
enforcing a statute of limitations in cases in which such a statute
would be enforced at law.4 Yet how can the statute be said to
run against one on whom there is no burden of asserting
affirmatively his claim, as the case of Rogers v. Murdock5
squarely decides that "a legacy is impressed with an equitable
lien for the legatee's debt, which the executor may satisfy despite
the bar of the statute."
The fons et origo of the English rule is the case of Courtenay
v. Williams' which held on general principles of equity that the
executor had the right of retainer despite the bar of the statute.
The Allen case attempts to differentiate the Courtenay case from
its own decision on the ground that the former holds a legacy
not to be a debt; that when the estate of the decedent has
claims against the legatee, no case of mutual debts is presented,
as there is something due as such from the legatee, while noth-
ing is thus due from the other. The Allen case entertains a
different view of a legacy, holding that for many years a common-
law action in Massachusetts could be maintained upon it, and that
it could be attached on trustee process. 7  Yet it is submitted
that to say that the right remains in the executor and that his
said: "We are of opinion that whether the strict rules of law or equitable
principles are applied in the determination of the question, the notes are
in either case barred by the Statute of Limitations."
8 Webb v. Fuller (1893) 85 Me. 443.
4Nininger v. Norwood (8882) 72 Ala. 277; John v. Smith (1899) 91
Fed. 827.
5 (1887) 45 Hun (N. Y.) 30.
8 (1844) 3 Hare, 539; see also Cadwell's case (1875) L. R. 2o Eq. 644;
Bates v. Coates (1863) 33 Beav. 249.
7 Vantine v. Morse (870) io4 Mass, 275.
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remedy only is barred is precisely to say that the legatee has
already in his hands, to the amount of his debt or more, those
assets of the testator which he seeks by his suit. The executors
may admit the legatee's right to his legacy of $2oooo. But they
can in all justice say to him he has $3oooo belonging to the
testator in his possession. Is it going too far to require him to
pay his legacy pro tanto out of those assets?
While there are several American decisions of courts of last
resort which accord with the English cases," there are other
holdings 9 of courts of similar standing in agreement with the
principal case. The brief for the latter series is presented most
effectively in Holt v. Libby.'0 There Peters, C. J., said 1 that a
testator is more likely to intend to forgive than to collect his
statute-barred debts when he made, no declaration about them
in his will, especially debts against children or relatives. In many
cases, he argued, such claims are covered by the dust of time
arid are forgotten, though found by executors after the death
of the testator. "In many other instances the advances are
intended as benefactions and gifts conditioned upon some unfore-
seen circumstances arising to make it expediet to regard them
as debts." Is not the presumption of forgiveness rather a violent
one, especially when the testator could so easily effectuate it by a
declaration in the will? Furthermore, are we to assume that the
passing of the day when the statute of limitations has run
automatically transforms the previous non-intention of the tes-
tator into an intention to remit? As to the fact that such claims
are dust-covered and forgotten, this is only a superficial condition,
for they are encased in the unsullied and enduring cover of
equity. Incidentally, as to both the first and third arguments, the
facts of the principal case are at variance with them, for it is
incredible that the testatrix intended a gift to the legatee of the
three notes, to which there were two other joint and several
8 "The claim may be barred by the statute and yet be properly set up
as a claim against defendant (distributee) in settling his distributive share
of the state. It may, as we conceive, be taken into consideration in
settling the estate, yet could not, on account of the statute, be enforced in a
suit at law.' Garret v. Pierson (187o) 29 Ia. 307; Holmes v. McPheeters
(1897) 149 Ind. 591.
9 Drysdales Appeal (i85o) 14 Pa. St. 531; Reed v. Marshall (1879) go
Pa. St. 345; Milne's Appeal (1882) 99 Pa. St. 483.
10 (1888) 8o Me. 329.
"1 (x888) 8o Me. 329, 332.
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obligors. The reasoning in the decisions favorable to the prin-
cipal case seems arbitrary and technical, and based upon a
questionable conception of the nature of a legacy and of the
statute of limitations. It is, therefore, submitted that the rule
of the English Chancery and the several concurring American
courts including the New York Surrogate, which has thus been
set aside by the principal case, would, if followed, effectuate
justice more amply and be more in accord with equitable
principles.
A. N. H.
EFFECT OF A PROVISION IN A CERTIFICATE OF FRATERNAL BENEFIT
INSURANCE THAT SUBSEQUENT BY-LAWS SHALL
CONSTITUTE A PART OF THE CONTRACT
A fraternal benefit association which issues certificates payable
at the death of the insured is essentially a mutual life insurance
company, and is governed by similar principles of law." The dis-
tinction between the benefit association and the insurance company
is that the policy issued by the latter is the contract, while in the
case of the former, the certificate together with the by-laws of
the association constitute the contract. 2 However, by-laws which
are enacted subsequent to the issuance of the certificate are not
binding on the insured unless he has so agreed, and even where
there is such a provision there must be some limitation as to
the extent to which the insured will be bound.
In Apitz v. Supreme Lodge4 the defendant society issued a
certificate of insurance to the plaintiff's testator which contained
such a provision. Later the lodge enacted a by-law which
provided that any member who disappeared and whose residence
was'unknown for one year, should stand suspended and that no
dues would be received in payment on the certificate. The in-
sured paid eleven annual assessments and disappeared in 1905.
The society refused to accept assessments after the lapse of one
year. In 1913 the wife as beneficiary brought an action against
'Modern Woodmen of America v. Coleman et at. (19o3) 96 N. W.
(Neb.) 154.
2Bacon, Benefit Societies, sec. 321; Sabin v. Phinney (1892) 134 N. Y.
428.
3 Peterson v. Gibson (19o) 199 Ill. 365.
' (i9i6) 113 N. E. (Ill.) 63.
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the society on the certificate, claiming recovery by virtue of
the doctrine of presumption of death due to the seven years
absence of the insured. The society set up the defence that
according to the by-law the insured was suspended in 19o6, and
for this reason, the certificate gave no right of recovery to the
beneficiary. The plaintiff claimed that the by-law was unrea-
sonable and did not apply to the certificate issued prior to its
enactment. The Supreme -Court of Illinois decided that the
by-law was reasonable and consequently valid.5
The common-law presumption of death which arises after an
absence of seven years has beerl recognized in this country in
many states,0 including Illinois.7  The question then resolves
itself to this issue: Is a subsequent by-law which, by implication,
waives the right of the presumption of death, valid and binding
on the insured?
It is generally held that by-laws which are contrary to the law
of the state,8 or which are unreasonable,9 or which change the
contract in any essential particular,0 or which affect the vested
rights of the insured, 1 are invalid and do not in any degree
affect the certificate. A by-law is usually declared unreasonable
if it materially affects the amount to be paid under the contract,
12
or if it lessens a primary duty which one party owed the other.
Some courts go even farther and hold that a by-law is unreasona-
ble if it attempts to do more than regulate the administration of
5 See also Baldwin v. Begley (igoo) 185 Ill. 18o: "A party cannot claim
the right to have a contract remain unaltered when the contract itself
provides that it may be changed."
6Davie v. Briggs (1878) 97 U. S. 628; Loring v. Steineman (184o) 42
Mass. 204.
7Reedy v. Millizen (1895) 155 II. 636; Whiting v. Nicholl (i867) 46
Ill 230.
8 Woodmen of the World v. Robinson (1916) 187 S. W. (Tex.) 215.
9 Weber v. Maccabees (1902) 172 N. Y. 490; Gilmore v. Knights of
Columbus (1904) 58 Atl. (Conn.) 223.
10 Smythe v. Knights of Pythias (1912) 198 Fed. 967.
1 Smythe v. Knights of Pythias, supra; Weber v. Maccabees, supra.
12 For the effect of by-laws reducing (i) benefits payable to the insured,
Poultney v. Bachman (1881) 62 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 466; (2) benefits pay-
able to the widow of the insured, Gundlach v. Mechanic's Association
(1875) 40 How. Pr. (N. Y.) i9o; contra, Fugure v. Mutual Society (1874)
46 Vt. 362; (3) benefits payable for total disability, Beach v. Maccabees
(i9o4) 69 N. E. (N. Y.) 281.
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the association and the manner of conducting its business.1 s
Courts in other jurisdictions declare that a by-law is unreasonable
if it introduces elements into the contract which were beyond the
contemplation of the parties when the certificate was issued."4
There is, however, another ground on which the decision of this
case may be questioned. Subsequent by-laws are invalid which
interfere with, or impair the vested rights of the insured.""
Although the rights of the beneficiary prior to the death of the
insured are merely contingent,'8 it is not true of the insured
who has a vested right in the contract 17 even though he has no
such right in the fund payable at his death. The trend of modem
decisions seems to be that the society cannot materially change
the terms of contract,' 8 for by so doing the contractual
rights of the insured are impaired. In the case of Woodmen oj
World v. Robinson'9 the question arose as to the validity of a
by-law which explicitly waived the presumption of death. A
statute in that state provided for the same presumption of death
after seven years' absence as existed at common law. It was
held that the by-law, being contrary to the statutory law, was
unreasonable and therefore void.
In the principal case, although no statute was involved, it is
submitted that this by-law clearly abrogated a common-law
right and was in derogation of the primary object for which
the insured had paid eleven annual assessments. His vested
sAyers v. United Workmen (I9O7) 188 N. Y. 280.
1 Newhall v. Legion of Honor (1902) 63 N. E. (Mass.) r, Justice
Holmes said: "The agreement to comply with future by-laws does not
mean absolute submission to whatever may be enacted by the company
in good faith . . . . and it does not extend to permitting a direct
deduction from the sum, which from the face of the certificate any ordinary
man would be led to suppose secure."
15Levine v. Knights of Pythias (1907) 99 S. W. (Mo.) 821.
'14 Sabin v. Phinney, supra.
7Ayers v. United Workmen, supra.
18 Smythe v. Knights of Pythias, supra, Justice Ray said: "Should a
clause be inserted in the contract whereby the citizen, a party to such a
contract with the government, should in general terms agree to be bound
by all laws of the United States then in force or that might be thereafter
enacted, would he be held to consent thereby to a change in the terms
of his contract made by some special act of Congress? I think such a
construction would be unreasonable, oppressive and unconstitutional."
19 (1916) 187 S. W. (Tex.) 2,5.
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right in this contract, by which he desired to provide for his
family at his death was impaired by a by-law to which, even by
implication, he never intended to consent. It seems that this
by-law falls within the prohibited class as it is unreasonable and
an infringement of vested rights.
R. W. D.
THE CHILD LABOR LAW'
The Commerce Clause2 of the Constitution has been invoked by
federal legislation for the purpose of stamping out child labor in
the states through a denial of the channels of interstate trans-
portation for the product of such labor. That the power of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce is exclusive and plenary
where it has attempted to deal with problems that promoted
the business of carriers as public servants, has become an ac-
cepted principle.' The real difficulties have arisen in the use
made of this power to regulate or prohibit certain forms of
commerce.
While the Supreme Court might have ruled that regulation of
interstate commerce could not take the form of prohibition, it
was early intimated that the power to regulate commerce might
be considered as an instrument for other purposes of general
I Act Sept. I, 1916, c. 432: "No producer, manufacturer or dealer shall
ship or deliver for shipment in interstate or foreign commerce any article
or commodity the product of any mine or quarry, situated in the United
States, in which thirty days prior to the time of the removal of such
product therefrom children under the age of sixteen years have been
employed or permitted to work, or any article or commodity the product
of any mill, cannery, workshop, factory or manufacturing establishment,
situated in the United States, in which within thirty days prior to the
removal of such product therefrom children under the age of fourteen
years have been employed or permitted to work, or children between the
ages of fourteen years and sixteen years have been employed or permitted
to work more than eight hours in any day, or more than six days in any
week, or after the hour of seven o'clock post meridian, or before the hour
of six o'clock ante meridian."
2 Art. I, sec. 8, 3.
3 Gibbons v. Ogden (x824) 9 Wheat. (U. S.) I, 195: "As to such com-
merce as is national in character and requires uniformity of regulation,
the power of Congress is exclusive." Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsyl-
vania (1884) 114 U. S. 196; Minnesota Rate Cases (1912) 230 U. S. 352,
398.
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policy and interest.' Under the Articles of Confederation the
states had not only the power to regulate commerce but the
power to prohibit. When the Constitution gave Congress the
complete and exclusive power over commerce, it is a legitimate
presumption that the power to prohibit was included.5  The
Supreme Court has, moreover, frequently declared -that the power
of Congress over interstate commerce is as extensive as the
power over foreign commerce,6 a power which in turn has often
assumed the form of prohibition.7
The real source of authority that Congress has relied upon
in the extension of its activity from mere regulation to prohibition
of certain commodities in interstate commerce is found in the
federal police power, and the constitutionality of the Child Labor
Law will have to be determined by deciding whether or not it
represents a legitimate exercise of that power. Although a
police power is nowhere in the Constitution delegated to the
national government it has been regarded either as inherent, or
established by its repeated exercise. Its foundation lies in the
right and duty of the federal government to secure the general
comfort, health and prosperity of the nation ;8 and when confining
their operations within the powers enumerated by the Constitu-
tion, Congress, as well as the state legislatures, may establish
police regulations. 9
As against the constitutionality of the law it has been argued
that Congress has made an unwarranted use of the Commerce
Clause to usurp the state's powers in a field belonging peculiarly
4 U. S. v. The William (i8o8) Fed. Gas. i67oo; License Cases (1847)
5 How. (U. S.) 577.
5 Thomas I. Parkinson, Congressional Prohibitions of Interstate Com-
merce, 16 CoL L. REV. 367. U. S. Const. Art. I, sec. 9: Congress was
forbidden to prohibit the importation of slaves prior to i8o8. The express
prohibition shows the implied grant of power to Congress to prohibit in
interstate commerce.
6 Bowman v. Chicago and Northwestern Ry. (x888) 125 U. S. 165;
Crutcher v. Kentucky (1897) 141 U. S. 47.
7 Embargo and Non-intercourse Acts (i8o7-iSog). Prohibition of for-
eign convict-made articles, Oceanic Navigation Co. (1909) 214 U. S. 330;
prohibition of importation of prize fight films, Weber v. Freed (1915)
239 U. S. 325.
s On the general subject of the police power in interstate commerce see
Freund, The Police Power, pp. 2, 63; Paul Fuller in 4 Coi. L. REv. 563.
9 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, p. 732; Munn v. Illinois (1876) 94
U. S. 113, 123, 125.
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to the latter, and is thereby violating the Tenth Amendment of
the Constitution,' in attempting to prohibit indirectly what it
could not directly prohibit. The position is taken that manufac-
turing and production do not per se involve interstate commerce
even though the goods made or produced are intended for inter-
state shipment." The Knight case, however, has been seriously
doubted and the emphasis laid on the idea that manufacturing
was set apart from federal regulation has been gradually over-
come. 12  The Fifth Amendment,"3 under which the Erdman
Act,14 providing that it be a criminal offense against the United
States for a carrier engaged in interstate commerce to dis-
charge an employee because of his membership in a labor organ-
ization, was held unconstitutional, 15 is also relied upon as a
ground for attack upon the Child Labor Law. If we adopt the
same test, however, as to the Fifth Amendment that is applied
to the Fourteenth Amendment' 6 the issue resolves itself into
the question whether Congress was making a reasonably neces-
sary use of its power, or an arbitrary and unreasonable use.
The enactment of child labor laws and the regulation of working
hours for women by the state have been held not to be a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Congress in its exercise of the police power has passed in
recent years a series of Acts prohibiting the use of the facilities
of interstate commerce where the health, safety, and morals of
the people were in a reasonable way connected with the subject
10 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people."
Il Coe v. Erroll (1885) i16 U. S. 517; Kidd v. Pearson (1888) 128 U. S.
i; U.S. v. E. C. Knight & Co. (19o3) 187 U. S. 61y.
12 Goodnow, Social Reform and the Constitution, pp. 77, 123, 126.
'3 "No person . . . . shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law ..
14 Passed June 1, 1898. 30 U. S. St. 424, c. 370.
15Adair v. U. S. (907) 208 U. S. x6x, Justices Holmes and McKenna
dissenting; affirmed as to a similar state statute, Coppage v. Kansas (1914)
236 U. S. i; see criticism of these cases by Mr. Louis D. Brandeis, now
Justice Brandeis, The Living Law, 2o ILL. L. REv. 467-468.
16 Slaughter House Cases (1872) 6o Wall. (U. S.) 36.
"7 Miller v. Wilson 236 U. S. 373. Chicago B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Mc-
Guire (1910) 219 U. S. 569; "Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary
restraint. Freedom of contract is qualified and not absolute."
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matter of transportation' s In all of the instances a clash of
national legislation with the powers of the states was urged, and
in all it was rejected. The Lottery Act,'
19 the Pure Food Act,
20
the White Slave Act2 ' have been sustained by decisions upholding
the power of Congress to exercise the authority involved. It
has further been contended that while Congress might validly, as
in the preceding cases, legislate to protect the consumer, it could
not employ its power over commerce to protect the producer,
when the articles prohibited are not per se injurious to public
welfare.
This might be a valid objection if it were not for the fact that
the constitutionality of such acts rests not on the limited grounds
of the harmful character of the commodities but on the broader
ground that the nation's morals, interests and health are con-
cerned,22 even though only in the manner of the production of
goods. It is the public welfare that is aimed at, whether the
product be harmful to the consumer or perfectly innocent.
23  On
this ground it would seem that the Child Labor Law should be
sustained.
B.L.
18 Obscene Literature and articles designed for immoral use, Act of
Congress, Feb. 8, 1897, 29 U. S. St. 512, c. 172; Lottery Act, Act of Con-
gress, I895, 28 U. S. St. 963, c. 191; Food and Drugs Act, Act of Con-
gress, June 30, i9o6, 34 U. S. St. 963, c. 191; White Slave Act, Act of
Congress, June 25, 1910, 36 U. S. St. 825, c. 395; Meat Inspection Act,
June 30, i9o6, 34 U. S. St. 674.
19 Champion v. Ames (9o3) 188 U. S. 320.
2oHippolite Egg Co. v. U. S. (191o) 220 U. S. 45; Seven Cases v.
United States (9,5) 239 U. S. 510.
21Hoke v. United States (1912) 227 U. S. 308.
22 Justice Holmes in Noble State Bank v. Haskell (IgIO) 219 U. S. 1o4,
III: "It (police power) may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by
usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant
opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare."
Also see the relation of the national police power to the state police
power in Champion v. Ames and Hoke v. United States, supra.
23 The Lacey Act, sec. 242 of Criminal Code of United States prohibits
interstate shipment of animals or birds killed in violation of state game
laws, prohibition of perfectly good articles of commerce, not injurious to
the consumer, but to protect the general welfare.
